

## PINDAR'S THREE WORDS: THE ROLE OF APOLLO IN THE SEVENTH NEMEAN\*

At the end of his account in the *Seventh Nemean* of Neoptolemus' death at Delphi and subsequent honours there, Pindar remarks: *εὐώνυμον ἐς δίκαν τρία ἔπεα διαρκέσει*. While commentators disagree on whether the reference of the 'three words' is anaphoric or cataphoric, there is general agreement as to the lack of numerical specificity implied. The view is forcefully stated by Lloyd-Jones:

When Pindar says, 'for justice . . . three words will be enough', there is no use in trying to work out what the three words are; in Greek 'three', like our expression 'two or three', can simply mean 'a few'.<sup>1</sup>

It is the purpose of this paper to suggest that it is in fact possible to work out what the three words are, that the reference is specific and numerically precise, and that the 'three words' epitomize Apollo's role in legitimizing the posthumous status of Neoptolemus, whose story in life and in death forms the central *paradeigma* of the ode.

The passage that contains the account of Neoptolemus' life and posthumous honours and provides the context for the disputed phrase comprises lines 30–53:

ἀλλὰ κοινὸν γὰρ ἔρχεται	30
κῦμ' Ἀΐδα, πέσε δ' Ἀδόκτη-	
τον ἐν καὶ δοκέοντα τιμὰ δὲ γίνεται	
ὦν θεὸς ἄβρὸν αὖξει λόγον τεθνακόντων.	
βοαθῶν τοι παρὰ μέγαν ὀμφαλὸν εὐρυκόλπου	
μόλον χθονός. ἐν Πυθίοισι δὲ δαπέδοις	
κεῖται Πριάμου πόλιν Νεοπτόλεμος ἐπεὶ πρᾶθεν,	35
τῇ καὶ Δαναοὶ πόνησαν ὃ δ' ἀποπλέων	
Σκύρου μὲν ἄμαρτε, πλαγχθέντες δ' εἰς Ἑφύραν ἵκοντο.	
Μολοσσίᾳ δ' ἔμβασιλευεν ὀλίγον	
χρόνον ἅτὰρ γένος αἰεὶ φέρει	
τοῦτό οἱ γέρας. ὦχετο δὲ πρὸς θεόν,	40
κτέατ' ἄγων Τροίᾳθεν ἀκροθινίων	
ἵνα κρεῶν νιν ὕπερ μάχας	
ἔλασεν ἀντιτυχόντ' ἀνὴρ μαχαίρα.	
βάρυνθεν δὲ περισσὰ Δελφοὶ ξεναγέται.	
ἀλλὰ τὸ μόρσιμον ἀπέδω-	
κεν ἐχρήν δέ τιν' ἔνδον ἄλσει παλαιτατῷ	

\* It is a pleasure to record my deep indebtedness to Alexander Dale for help with many of the points discussed here. My thanks go also to the editor and reader for *CQ* for a number of useful comments and suggestions.

<sup>1</sup> H. Lloyd-Jones, 'Modern interpretation of Pindar: the Second Pythian and Seventh Nemean Odes', *JHS* 93 (1973), 109–37, at 133 = *Greek Epic, Lyric, and Tragedy: The Academic Papers* 1 (Oxford, 1990), 110–53, at 146. Cf. C. Carey, 'Pindarica', in R.D. Dawe, J. Diggle, and P.E. Easterling (edd.), *Dionysiaca: Nine Studies in Greek Poetry Presented to Sir Denys Page* (Cambridge, 1978), 21–44, at 37; id., *A Commentary on Five Odes of Pindar: Pythian 2, Pythian 9, Nemean 1, Nemean 7, Isthmian 8* (New York, 1981), 154; G. W. Most, *The Measures of Praise: Structure and Function in Pindar's Second Pythian and Seventh Nemean Odes*, *Hypomnemata* 83 (Göttingen, 1985), 174; L. Woodbury, 'Neoptolemus at Delphi: Pindar, *Nem.* 7.30ff.', *Phoenix* 33 (1979), 95–133, at 113; L. R. Farnell (ed.), *The Works of Pindar* (London, 1930), 2.296.

Αἰακιδᾶν κρεόντων τὸ λοιπὸν ἔμμεναι 45  
 θεοῦ παρ' εὐτειχέα δόμον, ἥροϊσιν δὲ πομπαῖς  
 θεμισκόπον οἰκεῖν ἔοντα πολυθύτοις.  
 εὐώνυμον ἐς δίκαν τρία ἔπεα διαρκέσει  
 οὐ ψεύδεις ὁ μάρτυς ἔργμασιν ἐπιστατεῖ.  
 Αἶγωνα, τεῶν Διὸς τ' ἐκγόνων θρασὺ μοι τόδ' εἰπεῖν 50  
 φαειναῖς ἀρεταῖς ὁδὸν κυρίαν λόγων  
 οἴκοθεν' ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἀνάπαν-  
 σις ἐν παντὶ γλυκεῖα ἔργων κόρον δ' ἔχει  
 καὶ μέλι καὶ τὰ τέρπν' ἄνθε' Ἀφροδίσια.

Controversy centres on the lines at the beginning and end of the passage cited: 31–6 and 48–52. For lines 31–6 the text cited is that of the manuscripts with the following exceptions:

(1) Line 33: for the manuscripts' *βοαθῶν*, Farnell's *βοαθοῶν*, construed as present participle masculine singular nominative of *βοαθοέω*,<sup>2</sup> and taken as referring to Pindar<sup>3</sup> (or, more precisely, to the 'I' of the ode's narrator, who is to be identified with Pindar).<sup>4</sup>

(2) Line 33: for the manuscripts' γὰρ, Hermann's παρὰ (required by the metre, supported by the scholia, and all but unanimously accepted).<sup>5</sup>

(3) Line 34: μόλον, an ancient variant (ἐμολον) of μόλεν (mss. ἔμολε[ν]), recorded in the scholia<sup>6</sup> and read by Hermann and others.<sup>7</sup> Construed as first-person singular, referring to Pindar as poet and ode-narrator.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Farnell (n. 1), 291 5; this reading (and construal) is accepted by C. M. Bowra (ed.), *Pindari carmina cum fragmentis* (Oxford, 1947<sup>2</sup>), ad loc.; B. Snell (ed.), *Pindari Carmina cum Fragmentis* (Leipzig, 1953<sup>1</sup>, 1955<sup>2</sup>); *ibid.*, vol. 1 (Leipzig, 1959<sup>3</sup>, 1964<sup>4</sup>), ad loc.; E. Wüst, 'Pindar als geschichtsschreibender Dichter', dissertation (Tübingen, 1967), 144 5, 154 → C. Segal, 'Pindar's Seventh Nemean', *TAPA* 98 (1967), 431 80, at 445; Lloyd-Jones (n. 1), 132 (=145); G. M. Kirkwood, 'Nemean 7 and the theme of vicissitude in Pindar', in *id.* (ed.), *Poetry and Poetics from Ancient Greece to the Renaissance: Studies in Honor of James Hutton* (Ithaca, NY, 1975), 56 90, at 81 2; A. Köhnken, *Die Funktion des Mythos bei Pindar: Interpretationen zu sechs Pindargedichten*, Untersuchungen zur antiken Literatur und Geschichte 12 (Berlin, 1971), 67 and nn. 143, 144; B. Snell and H. Maehler (edd.), *Pindarus Pars I: Epinicia* (Leipzig, 1971<sup>5</sup>, 1980<sup>6</sup>), ad loc.; G.W. Most, 'Pindar, *Nem.* 7, 31 36', *Hermes* 114 (1986), 262 71, at 268 70; cf. *id.*, *Measures* (n. 1), 157; and W.H. Race (ed. and trans.), *Pindar: Nemean Odes, Isthmian Odes, Fragments*, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA, 1997), ad loc. (Cf. Schmidt's emendation *βοαθέων* with the same interpretation, noted but rejected by Farnell [n. 1], accepted by Carey, *Commentary* [n. 1].) (This list, as similar instances below, is intended to be representative, not exhaustive.)

<sup>3</sup> With Wüst (n. 2), Segal (n. 2), Lloyd Jones (n. 1), Snell Maehler (editions 5 and 6) (n. 2), and Race (n. 2).

<sup>4</sup> Cf. M. R. Lefkowitz, *First Person Fictions: Pindar's Poetic 'I'* (Oxford, 1991).

<sup>5</sup> See D. E. Gerber, *Emendations in Pindar 1513–1972* (Amsterdam, 1976), 115.

<sup>6</sup> *Σ Nem.* 7.47 (Drachmann III 123.1).

<sup>7</sup> W. J. Slater ('Doubts about Pindaric interpretation', *CJ* 72 [1977], 193 208, at 206) is too severe on the provenance of μόλον ('*molon* has no ms. authority'); see Carey, *Commentary* (n. 1), 148 9, who judges, more reasonably, that 'We may conclude that μόλον and μόλεν are ancient variants.' (It will be clear from the discussion in the text, however, that I disagree with Carey's judgement ['Pindarica' (n. 1), 44, n. 96] that 'the reading μόλεν is convincingly defended by W. J. Slater'.)

<sup>8</sup> With G. Fraccaroli, *Le Ode di Pindaro* (Verona, 1894), 588, n. 2; G. Hermann in C. G. Heyne (ed.), *Pindari carmina* (Göttingen, 1798), ad loc.; U. von Wilamowitz Moellendorf, 'Pindars siebentes nemeisches Gedicht', *SB Berl* (1908), 328 52; Wüst (n. 2); Segal (n. 2), 445 9; Lloyd Jones (n. 1), 132 3 (=145 6); Snell Maehler (editions 5 and 6) (n. 2); Race (n. 2). For those who take the verb as third person plural, see Most, *Hermes* (n. 2), 264, n. 6.

(4) Line 35: Triclinius' *Πριάμον* for the manuscripts' *Πριάμοιο* (required by the metre and generally accepted).<sup>9</sup>

(5) The punctuation accords with the sense obtained from these readings: full stop after *τεθνακότων* and after *χθονός*, instead of the manuscripts' *τεθνακότων/βοαθών* .../... *χθονός*.<sup>10</sup>

Taking *βοαθῶν* and *μόλον* to refer to the poet as ode-narrator situates the claim of these lines within the context of the ode up to this point. Having begun with a reference to deity by whose grace mortals may achieve excellence which is then immortalized in song—the constant theme and *raison d'être* of epinician poetry, here voiced in the first strophe and repeated *three times* in the antistrophe<sup>11</sup>—Pindar moves from Sogenes, who has been openly acknowledged for excellence and is in the process of being praised in song for that excellence, to Sogenes' legendary kinsman Ajax, who suffered the double misfortune of being denied acknowledgement of his excellence both by his peers and by his poet.<sup>12</sup> The sombre note of human misfortune, subject to chance and mutability, already sounded in the first strophe,<sup>13</sup> is elaborated in this *paradeigma*, closed by the gnome that all men die, whether esteemed or not (30–1). But at once the theme of immortality in song is opened up again. Even after death the tender, graceful story left behind by a mortal man may be nurtured to full flower by a god, thereby bestowing lasting honour (31–2).

The vehicle for such lasting honour is, as always, immortal song—the epic poets' *κλέος ἄφθιτον*—and so Pindar comes to Delphi as a helper, an ally (33–4)—both to the god and to the man—to record and exalt the honour shown to another of Sogenes' legendary kinsmen, Neoptolemus, by Apollo, who killed him for his crimes but honoured him posthumously with burial within the god's holy precinct (34–5). If his *ἔργα* were not wholly *καλά* (cf. 14), he nevertheless was granted the *ἄποινα μόχθων* (16) due to those who toil at deeds of valour and succeed.

This interpretation was considered by Farnell but rejected on the ground that it 'gives a jerky, dislocated style to the whole passage', a charge that is true of Farnell's English paraphrase but not of Pindar's Greek.<sup>14</sup> On the contrary, a smooth, logical progression is assured by the word order and the articulatory discourse particles *τοι* (33) and *δέ* (34), emphasizing respectively *βοαθῶν* and *Πυθίοισι*. Pindar's observation that honour comes into being for those whose fame 'god'/'a god' (*θεός*) increases after their death is followed immediately by *βοαθῶν τοι παρὰ μέγαν ὀμφαλὸν εὐρυκόλπου/μόλον χθονός*, 'As a helper then—as a *helper*, don't you know—I come at this point in my story, in my song, to the great navel of broad-bosomed earth.' Now the audience reinterprets the *θεός* of the previous

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Gerber (n. 5).

<sup>10</sup> The manuscript punctuation following *βοαθῶν* is accepted by, among others, Most, *Hermes* (n. 2), 268; cf. id., *Measures* (n. 1), 157 (with *ἐν Πυθίοισι δὲ δαπέδοις κείται* set off by dashes).

<sup>11</sup> *Ἐλεῖθνα .../... σὺν δὲ τίν/καὶ παῖς ὁ Θεαρίωνος ἀρετᾶ κριθεῖς/εὐδοξὸς αἰείδεται Σωγένης μετὰ πενταέθλοισι*, 1 ... 6 8; Sogenes lives in a 'song loving' (*φιλόμολπον*) city of warriors and athletes (9 10); great deeds are known only through hymns (*ὑμνων*) (11 13); the reward for labours is found in poetry's famous songs (*κλυταῖς ἐπέων ἀοιδαῖς*) (14 16).

<sup>12</sup> 20 30: If men had seen the truth, Ajax would not have been driven to suicide through being denied victory in the contest for the arms of Achilles; after Achilles he was best. But Odysseus' story has become greater than events deserved, through Homer's false and deceptive tales. (For a different perspective on Ajax' debt to Homer, see the account at *Isthm.* 4.35 42.)

<sup>13</sup> *ἀναπνέομεν δ' οὐχ ἅπαντες ἐπὶ ἴσα/εἴργει δὲ πότμῳ ζυγένηθ' ἕτερον ἕτερα*, 5 6.

<sup>14</sup> Farnell (n. 1), 294: 'God increases men's fame after death: I went to Delphi to help him: but Neoptolemos lies under the soil.'

claim: a specific instance of the gnomic truth is to be considered, and not just any god is meant but *the* god, the god of Delphi, Apollo.<sup>15</sup> And now the *βοαθοῶν* is particularly evocative: the poet comes as a *helper* to the *Helper* god;<sup>16</sup> the word play in the clause-initial participle is signalled by the enclitic *τοι*, ensuring that the pointed usage is not overlooked.<sup>17</sup> *βοαθοῶν* referring to Pindar (rather than Apollo or Neoptolemus)<sup>18</sup> makes more structural and poetic sense in the context of the ode and fits Pindar's view, expressed elsewhere, of his role as praise-poet.<sup>19</sup>

*μόλον* is to be taken in a figurative sense, as seen by Segal,<sup>20</sup> who adduces the parallel of a figurative arrival in *Olympian* 6 of the poet with the victorious mule-team and their charioteer 'going' to Pitana on the Eurotas (24) and 'coming to', 'arriving at' (28) the lineage of Hagesias' family. The verbs of 'going' in the *Ol.* 6 passage are modal and thus provide no parallel for indicative usage, but if Pindar wished to make the figurative statement 'I come', whether to Pitana or Delphi or anywhere else on the map or off it, how else would he do it? Aorist forms are precisely what is wanted in such a context.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>15</sup> Cf. line 40. It was regular usage among the Athenians to refer to Apollo simply as 'the god', as observed, for example, by T. Gould on *OT* 86 (*Oedipus the King: A Translation with Commentary* [Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1970], 26).

<sup>16</sup> *βοηδρόμιος* was a cult title of Apollo at Delphi (cf. Callim. *Ap.* 69) and *Βοαθόος* was the name of a month in the Delphic calendar (cf. Callim. *Del.* 27: *βοαθόος* as an epithet of Apollo at Delos).

<sup>17</sup> See J. D. Denniston, *The Greek Particles* (Oxford, 1950<sup>2</sup>), 537–55.

<sup>18</sup> For example, Carey, *Commentary* (n. 1) 150 (Neoptolemus); Most, *Hermes* (n. 2) 270 (*θεός*).

<sup>19</sup> For example, *Ol.* 13.96–7, 1.110, 9.83; *Pae.* 6.10–11. See Lloyd-Jones (n. 1), 132 (= 145) and Segal (n. 2), 447. The interpretation of *βοαθόων* as genitive plural, taken with *τεθνακότων* as referring to 'dead champions' honoured at Delphi, was peremptorily condemned by Wilamowitz as '*heller Unsinn*' and refuted in detail by Farnell (n. 1), 292—convincingly, in spite of Woodbury's (n. 1) subsequent attempt at resuscitation (and Maehler's acceptance in editions 7 and 8 of Snell–Maehler [Leipzig, 1984<sup>7</sup>, 1987<sup>8</sup>]). As Carey rightly observes (*Commentary* [n. 1], 149), 'this reading is disastrous for the progress of thought in the ode. It contradicts 11ff., narrowing the possibility of *τιμὰ* so as to offer Sogenes no hope.'

<sup>20</sup> Segal (n. 2), 447. His (and others') past tense rendering 'I came', however, obscures the sense. Carey's objection (*Commentary* [n. 1], 150) that 'aorists such as *ἐμολον*, *ἔβαν* always refer to the arrival of poet/chorus at the place of performance' is not compelling; see below, text and n. 21.

<sup>21</sup> Goodwin, *Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb* (rev. edn, London, 1889), §60, notes that: 'The aorist is sometimes used colloquially by the poets (especially the dramatists) when a sudden action, which is *just taking place*, is spoken of as if it had already happened.' This usage, however, is not, as Goodwin implies it is, a departure from standard usage in the sense of an innovating colloquial deviation; it is, rather, an archaizing usage, continuing the original aspectual (non temporal) function of the aorist. In verbs of telic *Aktionsart*, such as *μολεῖν*, the root aorist is the unmarked form (both morphologically and semantically), expressing the basic action of the verb irrespective of time. (In *μολεῖν*, *μολ-* is generalized as the uniform root in the aorist [and future] from \**μελ-* [\* < *melH<sub>3</sub>*–] and its ablaut forms [with the phonological developments undergone by some] via metathesis and levelling: see A. L. Sihler, *New Comparative Grammar of Greek and Latin* [New York and Oxford, 1995], §106.2.) This usage occurs in the attested literature even with augmented forms (cf. e.g. *Il.* 4.243 *ἔστητε*), although the original usage was of course without the augment, as here; moreover, it spreads to sigmatic aorists built to verbs of atelic *Aktionsart* (as well as secondary sigmatic aorists built to presents formed from root aorists, either characterized by stem formants [e.g. *sk<sup>e</sup>/o*, *y<sup>e</sup>/o*] or back formed [although these often indicate ingressive (vel sim.) action]); for the two types (non ingressive and ingressive), cf., for example, *Od.* 8.481 *φίλησε*; Aesch. *Ag.* 1192 *ἀπέπνυσαν*; *Il.* 1.33 *ἔδδαισεν*. See J. D. Denniston (ed.), *Euripides: Electra* (Oxford, 1939), ad verses 215 and 248; W. S. Barrett (ed.), *Euripides: Hippolytos* (Oxford, 1964), on verse 614. Denniston refers to Kühner–Gerth, *Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache*

The δέ of 34 marks a paratactic progression, in effect explanatory: 'Why do I mention Delphi?—Because Neoptolemus is buried there.'<sup>22</sup> Usages such as this are best interpreted as remnants—found, not surprisingly, in archaic poetic traditions—of the original function of particles such as δέ not as connectives but as enclitic emphasizing particles in a paratactic structure, as analysed by Meillet.<sup>23</sup>

Pindar says in effect: 'In order to illustrate the honour that a god can bestow upon a mortal—and, moreover, through the medium of poetry—I turn now to Delphi, and I do so because that is where Neoptolemus is buried. It is in Pytho's holy ground that he lies, and he lies there *because* he sacked Priam's city.' The related themes of different fates allotted to different men and a mixture of good and bad allotted to any given individual (cf. 5–6 and 54–8) are illustrated in Neoptolemus' story, the former in relation specifically to Ajax (20–30), the latter to be echoed in the transition to praise of Thearion, whose gifts from Fate are predominantly positive (54–60) and who is fortunate also in having as a guest-friend a praise-poet who brings him true fame in song (60–3).

The transition from Ajax' story to Neoptolemus' is made via the gnomic observation that death comes to all men, whether esteemed or not. Other interpretations of ἀδόκητον καὶ δοκέοντα in 31 (for example, 'the unexpected and the expecting')<sup>24</sup> obscure the point of the gnome and its structural function in the ode.<sup>25</sup> Not only is the following τιμὰ relevant, so also is the preceding story of Ajax and Odysseus; hence

(Hanover, 1904<sup>3</sup>), II.i.163 5, for 'an excellent account of the aorist apparently used for the present'; see Denniston's note on *El.* 248, where he refers to ῥιμῶσα at *Med.* 791 as used 'for οἰμῶζω'. This observation points up the error of the perspective which sees these types of aoristic usage as strategies of stylistics. They are, rather, vestiges of an Indo-European verbal system, the morphosemantics of which operated via the alignment of formal (stem) classes with functional (semantic) categories in the verb. (Even though the onomatopoeic verb ῥιμῶσα is a sigmatic aorist formed to a present in -ζω [ $\leq \text{ῥ}^{\text{ο}}$ ]), the inherent semantics of the verb, expressing as it does the uttering of the exclamation οἶμοι, a telic action, favours aoristic usage.)

<sup>22</sup> See Denniston (n. 17), 169 (δέ for γάρ); cf. 182 ('resumptive' δέ; cf. δή). Thus neither Farnell's 'but' nor Woodbury's 'and' is an appropriate rendering of δέ in this passage; such translations are in fact little better than 'straw man' arguments, set up merely and precisely for the purpose of being knocked down.

<sup>23</sup> A. Meillet, *Introduction à l'étude comparative des langues indo européennes* (Paris, 1903, 1937<sup>8</sup>), 372. Meillet's remarkably astute insights into the syntactic structure of the early Indo-European languages have been recently confirmed by the identification of (early) Greek as a 'non-configurational' language; see A. M. Devine and L. D. Stephens, *Discontinuous Syntax: Hyperbaton in Greek* (New York and Oxford, 2000) (although, inexplicably, Devine and Stephens do not mention Meillet; see my 'Greek syntax: theoretical approaches from Meillet to Devine and Stephens', *Museion*, series III, 1 [2001], 251–78).

The value of diachronic considerations in synchronic analysis is missed by (among, unfortunately, many others) Denniston (n. 17), 162, who dismisses such concerns as pertaining to 'only the history of language'.

<sup>24</sup> For example, Farnell (n. 1), 291; D. E. Gerber, 'Pindar, *Nemean* 7, 31', *AJP* 84 (1963), 182–8, at 187; Carey, *Commentary* (n. 1), 148; Most (n. 1), 154–5.

<sup>25</sup> The translation 'esteemed' and its negative is better in the context that 'the obscure and the famous' since it is possible (in English usage at least) to be famous without being actually esteemed, and esteem is the point at issue here. Asymmetrical readings such as Fennell's ('Ingloriously even on a glorious hero', *Pindar: The Nemean and Isthmian Odes* [Cambridge, 1883; 1899<sup>2</sup>], 87) and others' miss the polarity of the figure, which emphasizes the mortality of *all* humankind. ἀδόκητον καὶ δοκέοντα is a quantifier formula of a familiar type, as discussed by C. Watkins, *How to Kill a Dragon: Aspects of Indo European Poetics* (New York and Oxford, 1995), 41–9. In this case the designators both share and oppose morphological signs (the stem morphology and the inflectional morphology, respectively), via polyptoton.

the ἀλλά of line 30: 'Odysseus' fame was greater than he deserved; people are blind: Ajax was best after Achilles; but, ah well, we all die, whether we're esteemed or not (and, moreover, whether the esteem or lack of it is just or not). But, properly esteemed in life or not, a god can increase our fame after death (and poets are the vehicle of that fame). So, I come to the story of the honour Neoptolemus has received from Apollo—the subtext being the complexity of Neoptolemus' fame in both its positive and negative aspects (the latter notoriously dwelt on in the *Sixth Paean*).<sup>26</sup> Both aspects are undeniable parts of Neoptolemus' story and thus both are valid subjects for a poet (hence the final lines of this ode in which Pindar denies explicitly—what is implicit in the passage at hand—that he has ever treated Neoptolemus with disrespect, undoubtedly an allusion to the unfavourable reception assumed by commentators since antiquity on the part of (some) Aeginetans to Pindar's account of the circumstances of Neoptolemus' death in the *Sixth Paean*)<sup>27</sup> but here, among his kin, the positive aspects (the ἄβρός, 'tender', 'graceful' part of Neoptolemus' λόγος) are to be emphasized.<sup>28</sup>

The complexity of Neoptolemus' fame, his fortunes ever waxing and waning by turns, shapes the ensuing narrative (36–47): When he left Troy, he missed Scyros, his boyhood home (an unfortunate occurrence) but he reached Epirus where he ruled in Molossia (a fortunate episode)—only for a short time, however (unfortunate)—but his offspring keep that honour for ever (fortunate). He went to Delphi to propitiate Apollo with the finest spoils from Troy (a positive action), but when there became involved in a quarrel over the sacrificial meats (a negative action), during which he was killed (unfortunate), but his death was fated for he was destined

<sup>26</sup> Observing that *Pae.* 6 presents 'the death of Achilles' son Neoptolemus as a *τίσις*, or vengeance, of the god Apollo', Watkins (n. 25), 512–13, records with approval Ian Rutherford's suggestion ('Neoptolemus and the paean-cry: an echo of a sacred aetiology in Pindar', *ZPE* 88 [1991], 1–10; cf. id., *Pindar's Paean* [Oxford, 2001], 318–20) that the Pythoetonia-aetiology of the paean-cry in *Pae.* 6 serves to suggest 'that as an opponent of Apollo Neoptolemus is a sort of second Delphic dragon', and goes further to see the Neoptolemus serpent equation encoded in the basic formula of dragon-slaying in *Pae.* 6.112–20. Cf. W. Burkert, *Homo Necans: The Anthropology of Ancient Greek Sacrificial Ritual and Myth*, trans. P. Bing (Berkeley, 1983), 119–20.

<sup>27</sup> *Σ Nem.* 7.48, *Σ Nem.* 7.64, *Σ Nem.* 7.103 (Drachmann III 126.8ff., 129.4, 137.3ff.). For discussion, see especially W. Schadewaldt, *Der Aufbau des Pindarischen Epinikion* (Halle, 1928), 259–343; E. Tugendhat, 'Zum Rechtfertigungsproblem in Pindars 7 Nemeischen Gedicht', *Hermes* 88 (1960), 385–409; Lloyd-Jones (n. 1), 127–37 (=138–53); Most, *Measures* (n. 1), 133–4 and 203–13; M. Heath, 'Ancient interpretations of Pindar's *Nemean* 7', *Papers of the Leeds International Latin Seminar* 7 (1993), 169–99. Prominent among dissenters are E. L. Bundy, *Studia Pindarica* (Berkeley, 1962 = *CPCP* 18, 1–92) I.4.29, n. 70, and elsewhere; A. Köhnken (n. 2), 38–42; W. Slater, 'Futures in Pindar', *CQ* 19 (1969), 86–94 (see *contra* S. Fogelmark, *Studies in Pindar with Particular Reference to Paean VI and Nemean VII* [Lund, 1972], 93–116; G. Cerri, 'A proposito del futuro e della litote in Pindaro: *Nem.* 7, 102 sgg.', *QUCC* 22 [1976], 83–90); see now also Slater, 'Pindar, *Nemean* 7.102 –past and present', *CQ* 51 (2001), 360–7, reprising his views in response to H. Erbse, 'Über Pindars Umgang mit dem Mythos', *Hermes* 127 (1999), 13–32. For recent discussion and support of the apology hypothesis, see Rutherford, *Paean* (n. 26), 321–3.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. B. Gentili, 'L'effigie bifronte di Neottolema nel sesto *Peana* e nella settima *Nemea* di Pindaro', in *Letterature comparate: Problemi e metodo. Studi in onore di E. Paratore* (Bologna, 1981), esp. 108–9; cf. id., *Poesia e pubblico nella Grecia antica* (Rome, 1984), 185–91, esp. 190: 'La coesistenza di episodi degni e indegni, di azioni pie ed empie nel dossier biografico fu il dato proprio e qualificante della concezione greca dell'eroe.'

As discussed above, the god here is Apollo, but the *θεός* in the general statement of 31 is unnamed and, while clearly the reference is in the first instance to Apollo, we recall, with the scholiasts, that the Muse is also a *θεός*; the ambivalence emphasizes the fact that both play a role in the establishment and promulgation of Neoptolemus' fame.

to remain there for ever as a θεμισκόπος of ceremonies in Apollo's holy precinct (fortunate).

The complexity of Neoptolemus' story as told by Pindar supports the interpretation given above of lines 34–5: Pindar turns to Delphi because it is in Pytho's holy ground that Neoptolemus lies—and he lies there *because* he sacked Priam's city. Limiting ἐπεὶ to a temporal sense here impoverishes the moral dimension of Pindar's narrative. Lloyd-Jones urges a causal sense which will introduce 'not simply the statement that Neoptolemus took Troy, but the whole explanation of how he came to Delphi.'<sup>29</sup> I would go a step further: with multi-layered, systematic ambiguity, Pindar is making the point that Neoptolemus not only *went* to Delphi but *died* in Delphi *because* he sacked Priam's city. As Most observes, 'by the simple expedient of referring to Troy as Πριάμου πόλις' Pindar 'unmistakably set before the reader's [and, more pertinently, his listeners'] eyes the whole scene of carnage perpetrated by Neoptolemus'<sup>30</sup>—and, most importantly, he reminded them of the critical point that his atrocities constituted sacrilege. For that sacrilege Apollo had vowed to slay him and did so, ironically, in his own sanctuary where Neoptolemus had come hoping to propitiate him, and, moreover, through the agency of one of his priests, in a quarrel over sacrificial offerings.<sup>31</sup> It is not necessary to see, as many commentators do, a stark contrast between the account in *Paeon* 6 and that of *Nemean* 7,<sup>32</sup> it is a common theme in Greek thought that, while a god is the ultimate cause of a given action, especially a slaying, a man may be the proximate cause.<sup>33</sup>

Having slain him for his crimes, Apollo then honours Neoptolemus for his virtues by granting him burial within the holy precinct of Delphi. This is the final result in the causal chain of events beginning with his sack of Troy. Neoptolemus may thus be said—paradoxically—to lie in Delphi *because* he sacked Troy.<sup>34</sup> Most sees clearly that this is the only sense that can be extracted from the sentence beginning ἐν

<sup>29</sup> Lloyd Jones (n. 1), 132–3 (=145–6).

<sup>30</sup> Most, *Measures* (n. 1), 166 (my brackets). Most's interpretation of the Neoptolemus passage, however, differs significantly from that proposed here; see the discussion in the text below.

<sup>31</sup> For the μάχαιρα as sacrificial knife and therefore the slayer as priest, see Most, *Measures* (n. 1), 164 and n. 146. Furthermore, his death by *sacrificial knife* recalls another of Neoptolemus' questionable actions: his sacrifice of Polyxena, almost certainly regarded as sacrilege by Pindar's audience, as indicated by the treatment of the theme in archaic poetry and vase-painting; see the references collected in Most, 161–2.

<sup>32</sup> For example, Tugendhat (n. 27), 391, who sees the two accounts as significantly different stories; cf. Most, *Measures* (n. 1), 165: 'while both poems tell the same general story, they differ markedly in details of incident, emphasis, and motivation in such a way that the *Paeon*'s largely hostile account of Neoptolemus contrasts sharply with the *Nemean*'s uniformly favourable one'.

<sup>33</sup> For instance, the death of Patroclus, *Il.* 16.788–822, 849–50, or, indeed, the death of Achilles as treated by Pindar in *Pae.* 6.78–80: shot by Apollo taking the mortal form of Paris. Consequently, as Rutherford observes (*Paeans* [n. 26], 314), 'the discrepancy [of *Nem.* 7 with *Pae.* 6] is not so great, because Pindar has already established that Apollo can act in the form of another'. Moreover, I do not take ἀντιτυχόντ' in 42 as exculpating Neoptolemus, as do most commentators, in attributing his death to 'mere chance and bad luck' (Most, *Measures* [n. 1], 170; cf. to the contrary Rutherford, 314, translating *Nem.* 7.42 as 'where a man struck him with a sword as he struck back ...'). On the contrary, the perpetrator/victim to be is caused (enticed? invited?) by the deity to repeat his crime, *mutatis mutandis*, and is then, in the full flush of guilt, slain for it. The statement that Neoptolemus is slain by a priest (a man with a sacrificial knife, a μάχαιρα) while quarrelling over sacrificial offerings clearly points to yet another act of sacrilege on Neoptolemus' part.

<sup>34</sup> The paradox is missed by H. Pelliccia, 'Pindar, *Nemean* 7.31–36 and the syntax of aetiology', *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 92 (1989), 100–1; while he is prepared to allow a causal sense for ἐπεὶ in the passage, he sees only 'vagueness or confusion' in the construction.

*Πυθίοισι* and ending *Δαναοὶ πόνησαν*, but he rejects this interpretation on the excessively literal objection that Neoptolemus' sack of Troy is not the proximate cause of his receiving funeral honours at Delphi, and he adjusts the text accordingly.<sup>35</sup> But not even Homer in his relatively straightforward narrative limits himself to proximate causation (consider, for instance, Achilles' bitter lament that Artemis did not slay Briseis at the sack of Lyrnessos, thereby forestalling the chain of events that led to the death of Patroclus, or the complex unfolding of the causal chain that led to the action of the *Iliad*) and Pindar, of all poets, ought not to be expected to do so.<sup>36</sup>

Having begun his story of Neoptolemus with the observation that Apollo honours him, expressed in the general gnome that *θεός* brings a man honour by exalting his fame after death, a generality made at once specific by mention of Neoptolemus, Pindar ends his account with the observation that Apollo bears true witness to Neoptolemus' deeds, thereby assuring that justice is done him in his posthumous reputation. The controversy concerning lines 48–52 is focused on the punctuation and resulting variations in sense, and the identity of the witness. The punctuation of the manuscripts, followed by a number of earlier editors, is given above (p. 78). Most modern editors accept Hermann's punctuation: *ἐπιστατεῖ, / Αἴγινα, . . . ἐκγόνων. θρασύ . . .*,<sup>37</sup> but the manuscript reading was convincingly defended by Carey:<sup>38</sup> the *εὐμχανία*-theme, voiced in 49 and echoed and expanded, along with the wealth-of-inspiration and boldness themes in 50ff., cut off by the *Abbruch* of 52, all support the manuscript punctuation.

In addition, two further problems plague the interpretation of the praise of Aegina's descendants in lines 50–2: the construal of *θρασύ . . . οἰκοθεν* and the sense conveyed by *οἰκοθεν*. For the former, the most satisfactory solution is that proposed by Fennell and followed by Köhnken and Carey: assumption of an elided *εἶναι*, with the phrase *ὁδὸν (εἶναι)* taken in apposition to *τόδ'*;<sup>39</sup> of the many and varied objections to this view none has demonstrated that it is unacceptable.<sup>40</sup>

It is perplexing that the sense of *οἰκοθεν* has been so disputed,<sup>41</sup> particularly in view of Pindar's use of the word elsewhere (see esp. *Ol.* 3.43, 6.99, 7.4; *Nem.* 9.19; *Isthm.* 4.12). Carey's interpretation of *οἰκοθεν* as 'at home',<sup>42</sup> however, perhaps overemphasizes a locative sense; while the reference is clearly to stories of Aeginetan heroes, *οἰκοθεν* appears to carry more of an ablative than a locative sense. Even in *Nem.* 3.31, where *οἰκοθεν μάτευε* is taken by Carey and others as 'search at home', an ablative sense is to be preferred: 'look for stories that originate from Aegina'.<sup>43</sup> Pindar

<sup>35</sup> Most, *Hermes* (n. 2), 268–71.

<sup>36</sup> Another Homeric parallel warning us not to look to proximate causes is *Il.* 2.270: the Achaeans are 'grieved' not because of Thersites' recent treatment and present sufferings but rather because of his own *prior* actions. Perhaps the grief of the Delphians noted at 43 arises not in response to Neoptolemus' death itself (as generally assumed by commentators, for example, Most, *Measures* [n. 1], 171) but to his sacrilege in the holy precinct and the fact that a murder occurred within the sanctuary.

<sup>37</sup> This punctuation and the resulting sense is accepted also by Lloyd-Jones (n. 1), 133 (=146) and Most, *Measures* (n. 1), 174.

<sup>38</sup> Carey, 'Pindarica' (n. 1), 36; id., *Commentary* (n. 1), 154–5.

<sup>39</sup> Fennell (n. 25), 90; Köhnken (n. 2), 56–7; Carey, 'Pindarica' (n. 1), 37.

<sup>40</sup> See, for example, Farnell (n. 1), 297; Lloyd-Jones (n. 1), 133 4 (=147); Most, *Measures* (n. 1), 175.

<sup>41</sup> For example, 'by birthright', Most, *Measures* (n. 1), 174; cf. Carey, *Commentary* (n. 1), 156–7.

<sup>42</sup> Carey, 'Pindarica' (n. 1), 37; id., *Commentary* (n. 1), 157.

<sup>43</sup> Interestingly, while Carey translates *οἰκοθεν* at *Nem.* 7.52 as locative, he discusses it as ablative in sense.



has recalled himself from the Pillars of Hercules only to turn to Peleus and Iolcus, Telamon and Troy, and Achilles' boyhood with Chiron and later exploits at Troy—all Aeacid heroes at play in a far-flung world. The point, then, must be not so much geographical as cultural; the proper subject for Pindar's victory song is the traditional and familiar repertoire of stories of the Aeacid clan, not new and outlandish tales from the edges of the world<sup>44</sup>—an interpretation secured by Pindar's injunction to his *θυμός* at 28: *Αἰακῶ σε φαμί γένει τε Μοῖσαν φέρειν*. With the passage in *Nem.* 7.50–2 compare also *Nem.* 3.64: *τηλαυγὲς ἄραρε φέγγος Αἰακιδᾶν αὐτόθεν* responds to 3.31 *οἴκοθεν μάτευε*, closing the inner ring of tales 'from home', itself enclosed in the outer ring of the god-born race of Aeacus, opened with Pindar's address to his *θυμός* at 26ff. and closed with the address to Zeus in praise of his blood in the Aeacid line, his contest at Nemea where the victory was won, and the joy of the land of Aegina which partakes of both.

In *Nemean* 7, then, Pindar addresses Aegina and says that he is bold enough to say that for the splendid excellences of her offspring and Zeus' there is an ordained road of words, of heroic tales, running from her home, and he implies that he could take that road and it would lead him far and wide, to tell many splendid tales of many famous heroes (compare the hyperbolic claim of *Isthm.* 6.22–3: 'Countless roads have been cut for the noble deeds of the Aeacidae beyond the springs of the Nile and through the Hyperboreans')<sup>45</sup>—but he restrains himself with a typical observation that a sample is best and not the full catalogue.<sup>46</sup>

Both Carey and Most have advanced good arguments (along with some that are not so good) for understanding the *μάρτυς* to be Apollo, and both have drawn attention to some ring-composition features of the larger passage concerning Neoptolemus.<sup>47</sup> But the full extent of the structure of the Neoptolemus passage (31–49) and its implications for the interpretation of various disputed points has not been noted. The passage is in fact an elaborate and perfect ring. It begins with the general observation, soon made specific to Neoptolemus, that god can confer posthumous honour; it moves inward via accounts of Neoptolemus' posthumous honours, his defining crime, and his subsequent vicissitudes, to the central moment and pinnacle of his mortal life, his kingship, then moves outward in mirror-image accounts of further vicissitudes, a final crime, and returns to his posthumous (and paradoxical) honours, with an echo of the honour-bestowing *θεός*, the *μάρτυς*, the true witness who presides over and stands surety for Neoptolemus' enduring renown.

#### THE NEOPTOLEMUS RING

- a *θεός* honours dead heroes [Apollo honours Neoptolemus] (31–2)
- b Neoptolemus' burial in Delphi (33–5)
- c his sack of Troy: his crime, condemning him to death (35–6)
- d his journey inward (from Troy, missing Scyros, to Epirus) (36–7)

<sup>44</sup> Thus in a sense 'local saga' (Köhnken [n. 2] and others) but 'local' only in the ancestral lineage of the heroes. Cf. *Nem.* 4.69–72.

<sup>45</sup> For similar roads of deed and song, cf. *Isthm.* 19–29, 4.1–12; *Ol.* 8.13–145. R. Janko, 'Another path of song', *AJP* 112 (1991), 301–2, proposes to emend *κυρίαν* in 51 to *μυρίαν*, 'many a road'.

<sup>46</sup> Thus following Corinna's reputed advice—among other things, doubtless a literary reference to earlier traditions of catalogue poetry, whose poets unquestionably did not sow with the hand. Cf. *Nem.* 4.69–72, *Isthm.* 6.56–9.

<sup>47</sup> Carey, 'Pindarica' (n. 1), 38, *Commentary* (n. 1), 155; Most, *Measures* (n. 1), 159; cf. Pelliccia (n. 34), 100, n. 45, who sees a ring-structure in lines 34–50.

- e kingship: the pinnacle of his life<sup>48</sup> (brief but kept by his line) (38–40)
- d' his journey outward (from Molossia to Delphi) (40–1)
- c' his quarrel at Delphi: an echo of his earlier sacrilege, accomplishing his death (42–4)
- b' his burial in Delphi (44–7)
- a' ὁ μάρτυς [Apollo] bears witness to his just renown (48–9)

The witness, then, can only be Apollo.<sup>49</sup> As Carey and others point out, Apollo for Pindar *defines* the notion of being 'not-false' (*Pyth.* 3.29–30, 9.42). But of course Pindar claims truth for his poetry as well and, on the general principle that Pindar will never restrict his meaning to a unidimensional sense when multidimensional resonances can be evoked, we are surely justified in hearing at least an echo of the poet's role in providing a faithful witness to glorious deeds (cf. the πιστὰ . . . μάρτυς of fr. 94b [*Parth.*]). Just as Pindar is a helper to the divine Helper, so Pindar is a witness to the divine Witness; it is his song that bears witness to the witness-bearing of Apollo.

What, then, of the 'three words'? We now see that the reference is clearly cataphoric.<sup>50</sup> The claim that 'for fair-named justice three words will suffice' introduces the majestic proclamation that a true witness stands surety for Neoptolemus' fame, closing the ring of Neoptolemus' story and at the same time emphatically closing the question of Pindar's public pronouncements on this legendary Aeacid hero. *Nemean* 7 is not an 'apology' for *Paeon* 6; it is a magisterial lesson in epinician appreciation, rebuking any who may have dared to quibble at the Neoptolemus story in *Paeon* 6, thereby questioning Pindar's command of his art and his subject. The poet puts his faith in the μαθών, who will know if he sings 'out of tune' (68–9).<sup>51</sup>

Pindar began his ode with the name of Ilithyia, by whose grace Thearion's son is blessed with success and honour. He returns to the theme of children at the end of his song, first with an appropriately encomiastic prayer that Thearion's and Sogenes' children's children may always enjoy such honour as they themselves enjoy now. Then, in a sudden and unexpected coda, he turns abruptly to the issue of his treatment of Neoptolemus and now we see the negative aspect of children, clearly a metaphor for his unlearned detractors, the νήπιου who crave both simplicity and

<sup>48</sup> For Pindar's view of kingship as a man's greatest achievement, see, for example, *Ol.* 1.13–14.

<sup>49</sup> As seen by Carey, 'Pindarica' (n. 1), 38, *Commentary* (n. 1), 155, Most, *Measures* (n. 1), 177, and others before them; cf. Most 177, n. 193 (despite M. Bernard's recent reversion to the older view of the poet as witness ['Der Dichter und sein Gegenstand—Zu Pindars siebentem Nemeischen Lied', *Würzburger Jahrbücher für die Altertumswissenschaft* 21 (1996–97), 101–27, at 113]).

<sup>50</sup> Most, *Measures* (n. 1), 174, n. 176, refers to Bundy (n. 27), 21, in support of his view that διαρκέσει is 'a kind of epinician future' with anaphoric reference and adduces as a parallel for 'the whole sequence of thought' *Ol.* 13.98–100. But neither in this passage nor in any cited by Bundy does the epinician future have anaphoric reference. In *Ol.* 13.98–100 the poet says that he will reveal the sum total of the victories of the Oligaethidae at the Isthmus and Nemea; he does so in the next line. Cf. further *Ol.* 6.21: Pindar says that he will swear a great oath and bear witness to the hereditary gifts of Hagesias in prophecy from his father's family and in athletic skill from his mother's; then follow sixty lines (22–81), attesting to the virtues of the two families, which culminate in the honorand's. And so on. Cf. I. L. Pfeijffer, *First Person Futures in Pindar*, *Hermes Einzelschriften* 81 (Stuttgart, 1999), who rejects the notion of an 'encomiastic' future.

<sup>51</sup> Cf. Tugendhat (n. 27), 391–400; cf. also Carey, *Commentary* (n. 1), 136, and Most, *Measures* (n. 1), 207.

repetition.<sup>52</sup> That Pindar will not give them. In an uncharacteristically straightforward statement he categorically denies that he has ever treated Neoptolemus with disrespect.<sup>53</sup> But, he emphatically implies, the matter ends there. Neither for his present audience nor for future generations will he repeat his protestations of innocence on this charge. He has not 'worried' Neoptolemus' reputation and he will not 'worry' the issue of whether he has. Sadly do we miss a secure dating sequence for Pindar's work. It would be of great interest to know when he was invited back to Aegina, by whom, and what ode he offered on that occasion.

So, why does Pindar say three words will suffice and then give us, apparently, six? If, as commentators seem to agree, 'τρία ἔπεα' is a conventional phrase for 'a few words',<sup>54</sup> we would hope to find some support for this usage both in Pindar's use elsewhere of the number 'three' and in his expressions indicating intended brevity.

Pindar uses the number 'three' in a variety of contexts; instances from the epinicians are the following:

- (1) Three victories:
  - (a) a thrice-Olympic-victoried house: *Ol.* 10.1
  - (b) three prizes in Athens: *Ol.* 13.38
  - (c) with three victories you mastered Hera's local contest: *Pyth.* 8.80
  - (d) three times at Aegina and the hill of Nisus you [or I: see *app. crit.*] glorified this city: *Pyth.* 9.91
  - (e) a third wreath cast upon the hearth of his fathers [apparently the family's third Pythian victory]: *Pyth.* 11.14
  - (f) a double victory and a third previously among boys: *Isthm.* 4.71
  - (g) may there be a third bowl [i.e., may there be a third, Olympian, victory to celebrate]: *Isthm.* 6.7
  - (h) three victories in the pancration at the Isthmus: *Isthm.* 6.61
  - (i) three crowns at Nemea: *Nem.* 6.20
  - (j) three victors: Hagesimachus' three sons: *Nem.* 6.23
  - (k) thrice winning crowns [at the Isthmus] and thrice [at Nemea]: *Nem.* 10.27–8
- (2) Three refrains of a hymn: *Ol.* 9.2
- (3) Three-citied island (Rhodes): *Ol.* 7.18
- (4) Triennial [biennial] festival: *Nem.* 6.40
- (5) The third wind: *Nem.* 7.17
- (6) The third generation: *Pyth.* 4.143
- (7) The third continent (Africa): *Pyth.* 9.8
- (8) The third of the sisters (Gorgons): *Pyth.* 12.11
- (9) Third among elders someone proves superior (following child among children, man among men): *Nem.* 3.72
- (10) Tantalus' fourth toil along with three others: *Ol.* 1.60
- (11) Three and ten suitors: *Ol.* 1.79
- (12) Three snakes at the building of the wall of Troy: *Ol.* 8.38
- (13) Three daughters (of Cadmus' four): *Pyth.* 3.98

<sup>52</sup> Cf. Carey, *Commentary* (n. 1), 180, who further adduces for the child's lack of judgement *Pyth.* 2.72.

<sup>53</sup> The traditional and clearly correct interpretation of 102–4, despite Slater's (n. 27) efforts at reworking the syntax and H. Pelliccia's proposed emendation to ποτ' ἐφῆσει in 102 (*Mind, Body, and Speech in Homer and Pindar*, Hypomnemata 107 [Göttingen, 1995], 347).

<sup>54</sup> Most, *Measures* (n. 1), 174.

- (14) Three warrior sons of Zeus: *Pyth.* 4.171  
 (15) To plough the same ruts (or make the same claims) three times and four times is futile, like idly babbling to children *Διὸς Κόρινθος: Nem.* 7.104<sup>55</sup>

In each of these references (leaving aside for the moment the last) it is clear that the numerical reference is precise; in each case *three* items are meant: *three* victories, *three* cities, *three* snakes, and so on.<sup>56</sup> Only in the last passage (*Nem.* 7.104) is the numerical reference used in a pointed sense in which the precise numerical value is not crucial to the meaning of the phrase. Here 'three times and four times' means *many*, indicating redundancy in an activity that needs doing only *once*.

In support of the standard view that *τρία ἔπεα* at *Nem.* 7.48 means vaguely 'a few', Woodbury adduces *Ar. Nub.* 1402: οὐδ' ἂν τρι' εἰπείν ῥήμαθ' οἶός τ' ἦν πρὶν ἐξαμαρτεῖν, of which Dover comments: 'Three was a proverbially insignificant number.'<sup>57</sup> Indeed, in many cultures the numbers 'one', 'two', and 'three' have a special status and are used both positively and negatively to make rhetorical points; but as *Nem.* 7.104 attests, the number 'three' does not *necessarily* indicate an 'insignificant' number; much depends on context. Clearly in *Ar. Nub.* 1402 the sense is general and limiting: 'I could hardly speak at all without making a mistake.' And yet it is surely a fair assumption that if Pheidippides had followed his claim of not being able to get out without error *three* words (or phrases or sentences: *ῥήματα*) with an illustrative example in which he managed to speak *six* words (or phrases or sentences) without tripping up, the discrepancy would have raised a good laugh from the audience.

Similarly, in *Nem.* 7.48, the use of the verb *διαρκεσει* in itself shows that the *τρία ἔπεα* are to be understood in a limiting sense; the phrase clearly indicates that only a brief statement is needed and only a brief statement will be made. The question is not whether the phrase *τρία ἔπεα* is used here to indicate brevity—it is clear that it is—but whether the actual *meaning* of *τρία* here is vague: 'a few', or whether it means precisely 'three', as it does in its uses elsewhere in the odes.

The corollary is: how does Pindar elsewhere indicate intended brevity? Happily, we have other instances since this is an epinician topos, a sub-category of the oft-repeated concern with avoiding excess and prolixity in celebrating his *laudandi* (as in *Nem.* 7.50–3; cf. *Pyth.* 1.82, 8.29–32 and *Ol.* 2.95–100, 13.9–10, 13.45–8). *Pyth.* 9.76–9 contains a succinct statement of the dangers of excess and the virtues of careful selection, while *Isthm.* 6 provides an excellent example of the full topos of rejecting prolixity in praise:

22–3: Countless roads have been cut for the noble deeds of the Aeacidae beyond the springs of the Nile and through the Hyperboreans;

<sup>55</sup> As Carey comments (*Commentary* [n. 1], 179), ἀμπολεῖν means merely "plough"; clearly, the metaphor here depends on precisely what type of ploughing is in question. Since the ploughing of fallow land is properly done multiple times (cf. repeated references to a 'thrice-ploughed fallow field' νεῖος τρίπολος, *Il.* 18.541–2; *Od.* 5.127; Hes. *Th.* 971; and esp. Theoc. 25. 25–6, τρίπολοις ... νεοῖσιν ... καὶ τετραπόλοισιν; see West's note on Hes. *W&D* 462–3), and since Pindar obviously intends a metaphor which indicates *pointless* (ἀπορία, 105) activity, the reference here must be to the *ploughing of a furrow* for sowing: once is enough.

<sup>56</sup> Even Thomas Cole, who considers Pindar's arithmetic in certain passages to be 'faulty', concedes that it is 'unlikely that Pindar was simply vague with figures and ... ambiguous in citing them': see his '1 + 1 = 3: studies in Pindar's arithmetic', *AJP* 108 (1987), 553–68, at 563 (an analysis which I do not find compelling and which shows a startling disregard for Pindar's own view of himself as a faithful witness to deeds of glory).

<sup>57</sup> Woodbury (n. 1), 113; K. J. Dover (ed.), *Aristophanes: Clouds* (Oxford, 1968), ad loc.

- 24–56: Here are some samples: mention of Peleus, Ajax; exploits of Telamon and Hercules;  
 56–9: But it would take me too long to recount all their excellences. . . . In the Argive manner it will be stated in the briefest terms (*βραχίστοις*):<sup>58</sup>  
 60–1: States in two lines that his three honorands (the addressee, his brother, and his uncle) took three victories at the Isthmus and more at Nemea.

At *Nem.* 10.19–20 Pindar deftly blends hyperbolic encomiastic praise with the brevity theme in his disclaimer that his mouth is too small (*βραχύ*) to tell all the apportioned blessings of Argos' holy precinct—and in any case, he continues, satiety is a grievous thing.

In *Ol.* 13, for Xenophon of Corinth, Pindar turns at the end to the countless victories of Xenophon's family, the Oligaethidae, declaring first that he will reveal the sum of their victories at the Isthmus and Nemea in a 'brief word' (*παύρῳ ἔπει*, 98). That 'brief word' follows in the next verse: *ἑξηκοντάκι*, 'sixty times' was the herald's shout heard at those venues proclaiming their victories.

We have no actual evidence then, either from Pindar or elsewhere in Greek usage, that the specific number 'three', standing alone, is used in a positive context to mean vaguely 'a few', either of words or of anything else. Evidently, when a Greek-speaker wanted to say 'two or three' to mean 'a few', he said precisely that, as Demosthenes does in *De Falsa Legatione* 209. In an ironic comment on an adversary's threat of impeachment, Demosthenes suggests that instead of the many lengthy speeches involved in an impeachment process, his enemy could damn him with just two or three phrases (*δύ' ἢ τρεῖς ἴσως ῥήματα*), which even a new-bought slave could manage.<sup>59</sup> He then succinctly states the suggested charges, most interestingly in *precisely* 'two or three' phrases, that is, in three 'sentences' of which the latter two are coordinated with *καί* into one complex 'sentence'.<sup>60</sup>

In the absence of evidence, then, for the use of the number 'three' (or any other number) used alone with non-precise reference, we must consider the possibility that Pindar really meant to say that he would sum up the evidence for Neoptolemus' posthumous reputation in precisely *three* 'words'. As we have seen, the promised 'three words' are to follow in the immediately succeeding verse, which makes a claim about Apollo relative to Neoptolemus. It follows, therefore, that the three 'words' must be:

<i>οὐ-ψεύδεις</i>	<i>ὁ-μάρτυς</i>	<i>ἔργμασιν-ἐπιστατεῖ</i>
not false	the witness	over [Neoptolemus'] deeds-presides.

The question thus becomes not what Pindar means by 'three' but what he means by 'words': *ἔπεια*.

This is a difficult concept even now, and it was even more fluid for the ancient Greeks. In her study of 'Folk-linguistics and the Greek word', Anna Morpurgo Davies notes that while we have in English (as in other modern European languages) a *word* for 'word', contemporary linguists nevertheless continue to encounter

<sup>58</sup> Cf. Aesch. *PV* 505: *βραχεὶ δὲ μύθῳ πάντα συλλήβδην μάθε./πάσαι τέχναι βροτοῖσιν ἐκ Προμηθέως*.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. D. M. MacDowell (ed.), *Demosthenes: The False Embassy* (Oxford, 2000), ad loc. The Demosthenes passage is adduced by Carey, *Commentary* (n. 1), 154, as a parallel to the *Nemean* usage, but it illustrates quite the reverse.

<sup>60</sup> An adequate definition of the sentence eludes linguists still.

'notorious difficulties ... in their attempt to produce a definition of this concept'.<sup>61</sup> All the more problematic is defining what constitutes a 'word' for the speakers of ancient Greek since 'During most of its history the ancient Greek lexicon offers no exact equivalent for our "word"'.<sup>62</sup> Consider the use of *ἔπος* and *μῦθος* in Homer; as Morpurgo Davies points out, 'We have no evidence that Homer had the lexical resources necessary to ask questions such as "is X one or two words?"'. In Herodotus also *ἔπος* is used to refer to a single word (2.2, 2.30), a proverb (7.51), a verse (4.29), or a phrase or sentence (3.82). By the second century A.D. Apollonius Dyscolus is still using four different words or phrases to designate a 'word'.<sup>63</sup>

Nonetheless, lexical precision notwithstanding, evidence from various quarters indicates that a working concept of what constitutes a word was relatively stable from the Mycenaean period onward. And while Pindar uses *ἔπος/ἔπεα* for phrases, proverbs, and lengthy speeches and stories (for example, *Pyth.* 2.81, 3.2; *Isthm.* 6.67, fr. 35b; *Pyth.* 4.9, 4.57; *Ol.* 6.16; *Nem.* 10.80; *Isthm.* 6.42; *Nem.* 3.53) and such an extended sense would cover the use of *ἔπεα* in *Nem.* 7.48, the reference here is actually to what is more properly considered to be 'words', by the Greeks as by us.

*ὁ-μάρτυς* and *οὐ-ψεῦδης* are prosodic units resulting from proclisis of the article and the negative, respectively, with their host words. Although proclisis—as opposed to enclisis—was not recognized by the ancient grammarians,<sup>64</sup> evidence from a variety of sources attests to the presence of the phenomenon in the natural language. Cliticization of the article and of prepositions is indicated by various types of phonological reduction: reduction of long diphthongs, contraction, reduction of disyllabic forms to monosyllabics, assimilation of final consonants, and elision, as well as by metrical evidence such as the distribution of these forms (including the negative particle *οὐ*) relative to caesurae and bridges.<sup>65</sup> Inscriptional evidence provides further support for proclisis in the absence of interpuncts between proclitics and their host words, for example, *:ho παις : καλος : ναι :*, *ARV* 1.26, *:ou στησω*, *T.D.* a.23.<sup>66</sup> Similar prosodic union of proclitics and hosts is indicated by the graphic conventions of Mycenaean Greek, for example, *o-u-di-do-si οὐ-δίδονσι*, *PY Ma 01*, and of inscriptions in the Cypriot syllabary, for example, *o-vo-ka-re-ti οὐ-γάρ-τι*, *Cauer-Schwyzler* 685.3,<sup>67</sup> *to-no-ro-ko-ne τον ὀρκον*, *su-tu-ka-i συν τυχαι*, and so on.<sup>68</sup>

<sup>61</sup> A. Morpurgo Davies, 'Folk linguistics and the Greek word', in G. Cardona and N. H. Zide (edd.), *Festschrift for Henry Hoeningwald* (Tübingen, 1987), 263–80, at 265; cf. 275, n. 4.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid. 275; cf. 271.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid. 264–5; cf. 273–5. (Compare *Soph. Ant.* 53, *μήτηρ καὶ γυνή*, *διπλοῦν ἔπος*; *OC* 1615 17, with Jebb's note: 'ἐν... ἔπος, "one word," viz. *φιλεῖν*.')

<sup>64</sup> Cf. Morpurgo Davies (n. 61), 278, n. 32; A. M. Devine and L. D. Stephens, *The Prosody of Greek Speech* (Oxford, 1994), 356ff.; J. Vendryes, *Traité d'accentuation grecque* (Paris, 1945), 73.

<sup>65</sup> See Devine and Stephens *Prosody* (n. 64), 305 and 308. The atonicity of proclitics is, however, disputed by Devine and Stephens; see their careful discussion at 356–64 where they argue that 'proclisis does not involve complete atonicity but is merely one manifestation of a quite general tendency to reduce and compress accentual excursions in nonlexical words'.

<sup>66</sup> Devine and Stephens, *Prosody* (n. 64), 327; cf. A. C. Moorhouse, *Studies in the Greek Negatives* (Cardiff, 1959), 22–3; Morpurgo Davies (n. 61), 271.

<sup>67</sup> If indeed the Cypriot reading is correct: see Moorhouse (n. 66), 23.

<sup>68</sup> Morpurgo Davies (n. 61), 269–70. Moreover, even though proclisis was not recognized by the ancient grammarians, the specific type of article noun combination found in *Nem.* 7.49 would still have been taken by them as forming a unit in picking out the superlative instance of the type designated by the noun. This is Apollonius Dyscolus' 'par excellence' (*κατ' ἐξοχήν*) type of 'anaphora', as in his example *ὁ ποιητής* 'the poet' of Homer as indicating 'recognition of rank above all other [poets], and recognition of prior knowledge on the part of all

οὐ-ψεῦδης is an adjectival compound of a type familiar in Greek, in which the nexal negative οὐ (Proto-Indo-European [PIE] \*ne) spreads into the area of the 'special' negative ἀ(ν) (< \*n-) as a prosodically fuller morpheme reinforcing the semantics of negation.<sup>69</sup> In the manuscript tradition οὐ is accented only when postpositive. The ancient grammarians, however, not recognizing the phenomenon of proclisis, uniformly marked οὐ with an acute accent. The issue is further complicated by the fact that nexal οὐ often indeed does not stand in proclisis and could thus receive the accent, at least in principle.<sup>70</sup> As a consequence, as Moorhouse judiciously concludes, 'οὐ was sometimes proclitic [as in the case of the 'special' negative], and at other times not, according to the degree of independence that it enjoyed in the sentence', a situation that would explain, as Moorhouse further observes, 'the division of opinion between the ancient grammarians and the tradition of the copyists'.<sup>71</sup> Such combinations of negative and adjective may form litotic expressions, as οὐκ ὀλίγος πολὺς. This is the sort of expression Pindar uses here: 'not-false' to express as forcefully as possible the notion of Truth as inseparable from the god, of Truth as finding its fullest and most profound instantiation in Apollo.

The existence of the Witness and his essential quality of truthfulness having been thus established, the verse then builds to a climax in the final phrase ἐργασιν-ἐπιστατεῖ, effectively a compound<sup>72</sup> expressing the activity in which Truth is enacted by the quintessential Witness: he is ever-present, ever-watchful, and all-seeing; he stands as Witness to, and surety for, the deeds of men.<sup>73</sup>

For an example of a phrase treated as a compound but with inflection of both elements we may turn to Mycenaean, which, happily, shows word division;

[i.e., everyone knows who Homer is]: F. W. Householder, *The Syntax of Apollonius Dyscolus, Translated, and with Commentary* (Amsterdam, 1981), 33 (1.43); see further: 'In this way the poet [= Homer] got the article as a permanently prefixed syllable ...' (33); and: 'We must consider ... which [nominals] not only accept the article but keep it permanently, like an inseparable prefix syllable' (1.45 [Householder 35; translator's brackets]). (Cf. R. Janko on πρόθεσις ['Crates of Mallos, Dionysius Thrax and the tradition of Stoic grammatical theory', in L. Ayres (ed.), *The Passionate Intellect* (Fs. I.G. Kidd) [New Brunswick and London, 1995], 213-33, esp. 226.) Just as Homer, as ὁ ποιητής, is 'the poet', so, for Pindar, Apollo, as ὁ μάρτυς, is *The Witness*.

<sup>69</sup> Moorhouse (n. 66), 4 and n. 3; but cf. 43; for negative phrases treated as single words by Plato (μὴ οὐ) and Aristotle (for example, οὐκ ἄνθρωπος), see Morpurgo Davies (n. 61), 273; cf. 275. For the disputed etymology of Greek οὐ (which cannot continue PIE \*ne), see W. Cowgill, 'Greek ou and Armenian oc', *Language* 36 (1960), 347-50; but cf. Sihler (n. 21), §117.1.

<sup>70</sup> Moorhouse (n. 66), 20-2. This would involve not pitch alone but a stress (focus) accent as well: see Moorhouse 148, n. 2; see also Devine and Stephens (n. 64), 482: in English, words 'most consistently assigned focus accent include those which indicate the speaker's commitment to the truth value of the sentence, like negatives ...'. On the question of prosodic phrasing and the sentence accent, see Moorhouse 150 and J. Moore Blunt, 'Problems of accentuation in Greek papyri', *QUCC* 29 (1978), 137-63.

<sup>71</sup> Moorhouse (n. 66), 23; on unaccented οὐ, see Morpurgo Davies (n. 61), 278, n. 31.

<sup>72</sup> The construction is reminiscent of Behaghel's law of increasing members, which states that the last member of a conjoined sequence is the heaviest: O. Behaghel, 'Beziehungen zwischen Umfang und Reihenfolge von Satzgliedern', *IF* 25 (1909), 110-42. *Nem.* 7.49 illustrates Behaghel's law in the strict sense if construed as an asyndetic sequence of appositional predications of the underlying subject Apollo; on any reading it illustrates an extended interpretation.

<sup>73</sup> The multiple levels of irony in Cassandra's response to the Chorus' anxious plea for propitious words at *Ag.* 1248:

ἀλλ' οὐτὶ Παιῶν τῷδ' ἐπιστατεῖ λογῶ

No Healer God presides over this speech

gain their effect against a background of expectation of Apollo as ἐπιστάτης of ἔργα.

*pa-si-te-o-i* = *pansi-theoihi* 'to all gods' is consistently written as a unit without word division in three series of the Cnossos tablets (Fp-, Ga-, Gg- *passim*).<sup>74</sup> The apparently dynamic status of this compound (which, in theory at least, could appear as well in other case forms with both elements inflected)<sup>75</sup> puts the Mycenaean phrase in a different category from the so-called flexional compounds of the later period, which show a case form in the first element but appear in fixed form, for example, *Διόσκουροι*, *δορίληπτος*. Mycenaean may also provide flexional compounds with a finite verb as the second element; the Thebes tablets show two apparent compounds, *tu-wo-te-to* (Fq 126.1) and *o-je-ke-te-to* (Fq 130.1), each preceded by *o-te*, the phrases interpreted respectively as *ὅτε θύος θέτο* 'when the burnt offering was made' and *ὅτε \*δείγης θέτο* 'when the opening (of the rite) or the revelation [cf. the Eleusinian rites] was done'.<sup>76</sup> Just as one may 'sacrifice' (*θύειν*)<sup>77</sup> or 'make a sacrifice' (*θέσθαι θυσίαν*, for example, Pindar, *Ol.* 7.42, 13.53; passive in TH Fq126.1, *tu-wo-te-to*), 'open' (*δγείγω*, *οίγω*, *οίγνυμι*) or 'make an opening of' proceedings (passive in TH Fq 130, *o-je-ke-te-to*), so one may 'deed-preside' (*ἐργεπιστατέω*)<sup>78</sup> or 'preside over deeds' (*ἐργασιν-ἐπιστατέω*). The close coherence of the two elements of the quasi-compound *ἐργασιν-ἐπιστατέω* results from the semantics of the verb (denominative from the agent noun *ἐπιστάτης*): one must be *ἐπιστάτης το/ῦ (ἐπὶ) something*; the meaning of the verb is completed only by the addition of its 'object'. Similarly, one may 'invoke' (*ἰσχυρίζομαι*) a *ῥῆκος* or 'ῥῆκος-invoke' (*ῥῆκωμότησαν*, Aesch. *Sept.* 46); one may 'guide' (*ἄγω*) an old man (*γέρον*) or 'old-man-guide' (*γερονταγωγέω*, Soph. *OC* 348); one may 'pour wine' (for example, *οἶνον ... χέον*, *Il.* 7.480) or 'wine-pour wine' (*οἶνον οἰνοχοεύντες*, *Od.* 3.472) or indeed 'wine-pour' some other liquid (*οἰνοχόει γλυκὺ νέκταρ*, *Il.* 1.598). In all such cases we have an alternation of grammatically heavier phrase with grammatically lighter; the use of the two in concert comprises an Indo-European stylistic figure seen in epitome in Cato's *suouitaurilia* prayer in *De Agricultura* 141.3: *lustrandi lustrique faciendi*, and discussed by Watkins as a salient aspect of Indo-European poetics.<sup>79</sup>

Prior to the detailed discussions of the Greek grammarians, the notion of what constitutes a 'word' appears, as we have seen, to have been based largely on accentual criteria, as indicated by various aspects of treatment in both the syllabic and alphabetic scripts, and reflected in Pindar's treatment of *δ-μάρτυς* and *οὐ-ψευδής* discussed above. Although the discussions we have from Plato and Aristotle are by no means conclusive, the examples they cite indicate that accentual considerations are fundamental to their categories, for example, Plato's contrast of *Διὶ φίλος* with *Δίφίλος*, Aristotle's contrast of *καλὸς ἵππος* with *Κάλλιππος*.<sup>80</sup> If this criterion is thought to rule out the combination of inflected noun and finite verb as a candidate for (quasi-) compound status in Pindar's poetic diction, the following considerations should be kept in mind: (i) the question at hand is what, for Pindar, could constitute an *ἔπος*, which need not be a 'compound' in our strict sense of the term (for example,

<sup>74</sup> Morpurgo Davies (n. 61), 267 8.

<sup>75</sup> Although see Morpurgo Davies's appropriately cautious remarks (n. 61), 267 8.

<sup>76</sup> V. L. Aravantinos, L. Godart, and A. Sacconi, *Thèbes. Fouilles de la Cadmée. I. Les tablettes en linéaire B de la Odos Pelopidou. Édition et commentaire* (Pisa and Roma, 2001), 185 8, 195 6.

<sup>77</sup> Used originally specifically of a *burnt* sacrifice.

<sup>78</sup> A specialized technical term, glossed by LSJ as 'to be superintendent of works': *OGI* 510.12, *IG Rom.* 4.1352, 818, Sch. Ar. *Pax* 605; cf. *ἐργεπιστάτης*, Epich. 212, Artem. 4.31, *IG* 3.486, 12(5).253.

<sup>79</sup> Watkins (n. 25), 165 9.

<sup>80</sup> Pl. *Cra.* 399a; Arist. *Int.* 16a; see Morpurgo Davies's discussion (n. 61), 272 3.



bláckbird as opposed to 'bláck bírd')<sup>81</sup>; (ii) the apparent treatment of the Mycenaean phrase *thúos théro* as a single 'word' suggests that in later usage also the combination of noun + verb substituting for single verb to express the same concept (a usage particularly favoured by Pindar) could well have been understood as a compound; (iii) the Greek verb in main clauses was apparently originally enclitic, as is the finite verb in main clauses (except in first position) in Vedic Sanskrit, a situation preserved in Greek in the enclitic status of *εἰμί* and *φημί* (and which led to the phenomenon of recessive accent in the Greek verb),<sup>82</sup> and vestiges of this practice might well persist in archaizing poetic traditions.<sup>83</sup> Given these considerations, we should see nothing anomalous in Pindar's reference to the phrase *ἔργμασιν ἐπιστατεῖ* as an *ἔπος*.

The interrelated concepts expressed in lines 48–9—the notions of justice, of truth, of witnessing and presiding, observing—form a complex of attributes and activities associated with sun-gods in a variety of Indo-European and Near Eastern religions. Richardson, in his note on the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter* 62, succinctly summarizes the causal links: the notion of 'the Sun as watcher over all things ... led to his invocation as a witness, and to his ethical position as guardian of right'.<sup>84</sup> The sky-god Zeus is pre-eminently concerned with justice,<sup>85</sup> as is made explicit by Hesiod, *Works and Days* 267–9 (cf. further 270–85).<sup>86</sup>

Πάντα ἰδὼν Διὸς ὀφθαλμὸς καὶ πάντα νοήσας  
καὶ νῦν τὰδ', αἶ κ' ἐθέλῃσ', ἐπιδέρεκεται, οὐδέ ἐ λήθει,  
οἷν δὴ καὶ τήνδε δίκην πόλις ἐντὸς ἔργει.

<sup>81</sup> Even in modern English a compound may be written as two words, for example, 'White House' as opposed to 'white house'.

<sup>82</sup> See Sihler (n. 21), §245; O. J. L. Szemerényi, *Introduction to Indo European Linguistics* (Oxford, 1996), 81–2.

<sup>83</sup> We are reminded of how limited and uncertain is our knowledge of accentuation in the ancient language, at the level of the word (especially for dialects other than Attic-Ionic), the syntagm, and the sentence: Sihler (n. 21), §243, 'The habit of generations of Hellenists of inventing accents for dialect forms ... cannot be defended in principle, and seems particularly incautious in view of the fact that in Lesbic, the only dialect for which we do have reliable information, the accentual system differs in important ways from the Attic'; Szemerényi (n. 82), 82, 'Nothing is known about the accentuation of syntagms and sentences in the old Indo-European languages.' See further M. L. West, *Ancient Greek Music* (Oxford, 1992) (with references to earlier work by the same author); Moore-Blunt (n. 70); G. Nagy, 'Reading Greek poetry aloud: evidence from the Bacchylides papyri', *QUCC* 64 (2000), 7–28.

<sup>84</sup> N. J. Richardson (ed.), *The Homeric Hymn to Demeter* (Oxford, 1974), on verse 62 ('*Ἡέλιον δ' ἵκοντο, θεῶν σκοπὸν ἦδ' ἐ καὶ ἀνδρῶν*).

<sup>85</sup> For Zeus' all-encompassing concern with justice throughout Greek thought, see H. Lloyd-Jones, *The Justice of Zeus* (Berkeley, 1971, 1983<sup>2</sup>). Zeus' original sun-god role is attested by his name, designating the bright, sunlit sky and cognate with the name of the Hittite Sungod *Šiuš* (*Ataš Šiuš*, cf. *Zeū páter*), the Roman *Iuppiter/Diespiter*, Vedic *Dyāuspitar*, Luwian *Tatiš Tiwaz*, Palaic *Tiyaz*; see Watkins (n. 25), 8 and id., "god", in M. Mayrhofer et al. (edd.), *Antiquitates Indogermanicae: Gedenkschrift f. Hermann Güntert* (Innsbruck, 1974), 101–10. His original role is recognized by M. L. West, *The East Face of Helicon: West Asiatic Elements in Greek Poetry and Myth* (Oxford, 1997), 114: '... his Indo-European identity was as the god of the bright sky, not the god of weather and storms. ... In Greek he has taken over the functions of a storm-god.'

<sup>86</sup> Compare Sophocles' 'golden eye of Justice', fr. 12: τὸ χρύσειον δὲ τὰς Δίκας/δέδορκεν ὄμμα, τὸν δ' ὀδύκον ἀμείβεται, and Archilochus' allegorical fox, for whom Zeus' concern with justice encompasses all creatures: ὦ Ζεῦ, πάτερ Ζεῦ, σὸν μὲν οὐρανοῦ κράτος, / σὺ δ' ἔργ' ἐπ' ἀνθρώπων ὄραις/λεωργὰ καὶ θεμιστά, σοὶ δὲ θηρίων/ῥβρις τε καὶ δίκη μέλει, fr. 177, M. L. West, *Iambi et elegi Graeci* 1 (Oxford, 1989<sup>2</sup>); cf. A. P. Burnett, *Three Archaic Poets: Archilochus, Alcaeus, Sappho* (London, 1983), 63–4, on the identification of the poet with the prayer of the 'Archilochus-fox'.

Parallels may be seen in the Indic Dyáuṣ and especially Mitra-Varuṇa, who supervises justice, oaths, and contracts, as also in the Avestan Ahura Mazdāh and the Babylonian Šamaš.<sup>87</sup> Among the Hittites, too, sun-gods guard justice and right.<sup>88</sup> The Sun-god of Heaven stands at the head of the god-lists of the Hittite treaties, and the great Sun-goddess of Arinna, the pre-eminent goddess of the Hittites, is hymned as the guardian of justice:

The inspired lord of justice art thou,  
and in the place of justice thou art untiring.<sup>89</sup>

Zeus and Helios are linked in Agamemnon's prayer in *Iliad* 3 (276–91) as witnesses (μάρτυροι) to the treaty of Greeks and Trojans, and guardians of the oaths: 'Father Zeus and Helios, who sees all things and hears all things.'<sup>90</sup> Similarly, Hector, proposing a duel to decide the war, calls on Zeus to *stand as Witness*: Ζεὺς δ' ἄμμι' ἐπὶ μάρτυρος ἔστω (*Il.* 7.76).<sup>91</sup>

Apollo also has recognized sun-god aspects: not only does he share the beneficent qualities characterizing this group of deities, he was explicitly identified with Helios in the fifth century, apparently by Parmenides and Empedocles, certainly by Euripides, all but certainly by Aeschylus, and perhaps by Pindar in the *Ninth Paean*.<sup>92</sup>

Neoptolemus' lasting fame is thus confirmed at the close of his story in the *Seventh Nemean*, guaranteed by the testimony of the ever-present, all-seeing, quintessentially truthful immortal Witness, and committed to the memory of men by the poet's immortal song. Apollo enacts justice by testifying to Neoptolemus' glorious deeds. And Pindar records that justice in his words. Laden with moral and judicial

<sup>87</sup> M. L. West (ed.), *Hesiod: Works and Days, Edited with Prolegomena and Commentary* (Oxford, 1978), on verse 267; cf. id., *Helicon* (n. 85), 542, of Šamaš as 'judge of those above, corrector of those below'.

<sup>88</sup> Cf. West (n. 85), 20 and 358.

<sup>89</sup> KBo 2034; O. R. Gurney, 'Hittite prayers of Mursili II', *Annals of Archaeology and Anthropology* 27 (1940), 9–11. On Hittite sun gods, see D. Yoshida, *Untersuchungen zu den Sonnengöttern bei den Hethitern* (Heidelberg, 1996). See also my 'Greek Athena and the Hittite Sungoddess of Arinna', in S. Deacy and A. Villing (edd.), *Athena in the Classical World* (Leiden, 2001), 349–65.

<sup>90</sup> Ἡέλιός θ' ὅς πάντ' ἐφορᾷ καὶ πάντ' ἐπακούεις, 277; compare the *Homeric Hymn*'s Helios as the Watcher over gods and men (see n. 84 above).

<sup>91</sup> See A. B. Cook, *Zeus: A Study in Ancient Religion* (Cambridge, 1914–40), 1.196ff.; R. Pettazzoni, *The All knowing God* (London, 1956); and further references in West (n. 8), on verse 267, and Rutherford, *Paean* (n. 26), 198 and n. 32.

<sup>92</sup> Rutherford (*Paean* [n. 26], 198) suggests that a certain lack of coherence in the structure of *Pae.* 9 may be attributed to the framing of 'an apotropaic *παῖάν* to the Sun' (in response to a solar eclipse) as 'a cult hymn to Apollo', a combination that would have been made possible by a view of Apollo and Helios as 'different aspects of the same divinity'. The earliest certain identification of Apollo and Helios in Greek literature is Eur. *Phaeth.* 225: see J. Diggle (ed.), *Euripides: Phaethon* (Cambridge, 1970), ad loc. See also A. S. Hollis (ed.), *Callimachus: Hecale* (Oxford, 1990), on fr. 103 (302 Pf.), and M. L. West, *Studies in Aeschylus* (Stuttgart, 1990), 26–50, on 'The Lycurgus trilogy', esp. 38–44. Aesch. *Supp.* 212–14 is disputed; see H. F. Johansen and E. W. Whittle (edd.), *Aeschylus: The Suppliants* (Copenhagen, 1980), 2.172. For further references, see Rutherford, 198, n. 32. For sun god aspects of Apollo, see P. Boyancé, 'L'Apollon Solaire', in *Mélanges d'archéologie, d'épigraphie et d'histoire offerts à Jérôme Carcopino* (Paris, 1966), 149–70, and for sun gods generally, R. Pettazzoni (n. 91); note esp. 156: 'Apollo Panoptes, despite his Greek name, is simply the oriental sungod in the hymn found at Susa.'

meaning,<sup>93</sup> and evoking a timeless tradition of theological certainty, Pindar's three words do indeed suffice.

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<sup>93</sup> Most's insistence, however, that the passage is to be understood as containing concrete juridical references (for example, *δικα* as a 'trial' [n. 1], 174; cf. 178–80) must be rejected as too limiting.